Blockchain technology has become a new model for encryption, unsustainability and confidence in both consumers and suppliers (SPs) in order to increase the quality of services. A game theory framework is used to simulate a competitive market with the existing platform controlled by a centralizer as a confidant third party to provide an economic overview of such a Blockchain-based platform sector. The portals serve as a mediator in this industry and provide consumers with services delivered by SPs. The key reasons for blockchain based network market performance are I how engagement by SPs represents its service efficiency (QoS) and (ii) how SPs are empowered to contribute their services, such as the virtual environment. A non-cooperative two-stage competitive game is used in our game formulation, whereby the first stage model how to promote SPs on a blockchain basis and the second stage modeleves rivalry between platforms to draw consumers. We therefore have an equilibrium analysis that offers a valuable description of the effect on competition among platforms and SPs' equilibrium reward policy of the service quality of the blockchain network. Our numerical analysis reveals that the incentive to balance is increasing proportionately to the Fault tolerance of a blockchain-based network when the incentive is unfavourable if the number of participating SPs has a non-increasing QoS. © 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.